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MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
OHIO APPELLATE SYSTEM
by
RICHARD L. AYNEs*
"Reform, Sir, reform!
I've heard enough about reform. Things are bad enough as they are.'
"A gentleman who was rather prominent in his community attained
his ninety-fifth birthday anniversary ... the newspaper reporters came
around to interview him: '... Well, you have lived a long, long time and
have seen many changes in your life.'
"And he said, 'Yes, and I was against every one of them'.""
T Is NOT AN unusual occurrence for one to look back upon times past and to
long for their return. Remembering appellate practice as it was when I
was first admitted to the bar, I cannot help but wish for the days when there
were no page limitations on briefs; when each party received at least a half
hour for oral argument; and when judges wrote opinions which, even if un-
published, fully addressed all of the arguments raised by counsel. This being
the case, I was naturally pleased to accept the invitation of the Editors of the
Review to write a conclusion - or Reply Brief, if your will - for this
Symposium.
It is, of course, a special honor to be able to participate in this dialogue
on the Ohio appellate procedures with such distinguished authors. Judge Bell,
who opens the symposium, is an able and respected judge before whom I have
had the pleasure to argue cases. Professor Parness is a friend and colleague
with whom I have worked cooperatively on many projects since we both came
to the Law School in 1976. Mr. Reagle is one of my former students whose
*Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. The author previously served as
a law clerk to the Honorable Leo A. Jackson, Judge of the Eighth District Ohio Court of Appeals (1975-1976)
and as the Coordinator of the Appellate Review Clinic of the University of Akron School of Law (1976-1979).
He is currently the Vice Chair of the ABA/Criminal Justice Section Amicus Committee, Chair of the
Ohio Criminal Defense Lawyers' Amicus Committee, and as a member of the ABA/Litigation Section
Appellate Issues Committee. He has been counsel in merit cases in the United States Supreme Court, the
Ohio Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and four of the twelve
Districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals.
'Comment of An English lord in the 1840s quoted in Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum,
32 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 321, 335 (1982).
'Senator Sam J. Erwin, Jr. quoted in W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975 at 11 (1980).
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career I watch with great interest. Though I do not personally know Mr. Marvel,
or Judges Black and Moyer, they are individuals whose articles and opinions
I have had an opportunity to read with favorable impression. As for Judge
Day, I knew him by reputation before our friendship began and find that he
deserved all of the favorable commentary he has received and more.
With so many different perspectives, there are bound to be disagreements
between the participants of this Symposium. Happily, those disagreements are
friendly ones which may have the effect of sparking new ideas which may be
productive in improving the appellate system and thereby enhancing the quali-
ty of justice.
I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EFFEcTS OF PROPOSED REFORMS
Though at times the reader may wonder otherwise, I really am not like
Senator Ervin's old-timer who opposed every change that he had seen in his
lifetime. But I do value highly the historic function that appellate courts have
served and believe that function is worthy of preservation.
Appellate courts have traditionally played an important role in maintain-
ing the integrity of the judicial system. They not only serve to correct errors
which may occur at trial but also provide a reflective forum for the refinement
of established principles of law and the development of new ones. Equally as
important, they maintain the boundaries of various departments of govern-
ment. If operating properly, they ensure that the humblest citizen shall be placed
on an equal footing with one who occupies the highest position and that for
every illegal wrong there is an adequate remedy. These functions become all
the more important in an age of increasing governmental activity and an era
in which the individual is confronted by bureaucracies in both the private and
public sectors. The traditional appellate court, as a non-bureaucratic institu-
tion, has played a key role in protecting the rights of individuals against the
overreaching that may naturally occur with bureaucratization.
Because I deem this role a valuable one, I make a distinction between those
changes which may improve the efficiency of the court and not change this
traditional role as opposed to those which would change the traditional func-
tions of the court. Three examples may make this distinction clearer.
Expanding case loads spur much of the talk of the need for "reform".
One solution might be to substitute the traditional review by a three-judge panel
with a new innovation under which the judgment of the court below would
be reviewed by a single appellate judge.3 This would triple the number of cases
that could be disposed of in a single year and quickly solve - at least in the
short term - the backlog with which so many are concerned. Such a solution
would be objectionable because it destroys the collective decision-making pro-
cess and thereby radically changes the nature of the appellate system.
'See Marvel, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REV. 43 (1982) and accompanying
notes.
[Vol. 16:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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By way of contrast, one might consider the use of new technological
advancements such as computers to keep track of cases or word processors to
prepare opinions. These innovations, if used properly, can enhance the effi-
ciency of the court system without altering its fundamental nature.
There are other alternatives outside the appellate system itself which could
result in a substantial reduction in the case load of the appellate courts. For
example, one imaginative scenario of a possible "future" of the legal profes-
sion posits a several-fold increase in the filing fee for all cases and the elimina-
tion of informapauperis provisions." This would drastically reduce the number
of cases filed in the trial courts and the resulting number of appeals. Without
respect to the merits of such a proposal, the example is an important one because
it highlights the existence of alternatives which would not undermine the tradi-
tional function of the appellate courts and would reduce the caseload which
produces the backlog.
It is from this perspective that the following proposals will be analyzed:
1) increasing court personnel; 2) increasing court efficiency; 3) prehearing settle-
ment conferences; 4) limiting oral arguments; 5) limitations on briefs; 6) use
of unreported opinions; 7) determinations as to which decisions should be
reported; 8) writing upon every assignment of error; and 9) sanctions for frivilous
appeals. After consideration of these topics, an alternative method of analyz-
ing the "problem," with potential solutions, will be advanced.
II. INCREASING COURT PERSONNEL
The view that an increasing caseload in the Ohio Court of Appeals can
be solved by increasing the number of judges in the respective courts is a "natural
response." 5 Yet, as Messrs. Reagle and Parness point out, this approach has
been generally unsuccessful. 6 Further, as Judge Day indicates, the addition of
more judges may, itself, have adverse consequences.'
Any rapid expansion of the judiciary may result in decreased quality in
the selection of judges. To significantly expand the number of individuals selected
from a relatively constant pool inevitably leads to the elevation of certain
individuals to the appellate bench who could not have otherwise attained that
position. If it is assumed that in a more competitive environment the "abler"
person would have been selected, then there will be at least an incremental decline
in the quality of the individuals selected to fill new openings on the appellate
bench.
A second consideration, not unrelated to the first, is that a "prolifera-
'Johnson, Where is the Law Heading? Four Legal Scenarios for the Future, JUDGES' J., Fall 1981, at 34,
42-43.
'Meador, The Federal Judiciary - Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 617, 641.
'Parness and Reagle, Reforms in the Business and Operating Manner of the Ohio Courts of Appeals 16
AKRON L. REv. 3, 8 (1982). See also Marvel, supra note 3.
'Day, Response to Professor Parness and Mr. Reagle, 16 AKRON L. REV. 37 (1982).
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tion" of judgeships can result in "a depreciation of the judicial currency" 8 with
a resulting inability to attract individuals of the highest quality to the bench.9
Further, the expansion of judges on an appellate court may produce institu-
tional problems that do not exist at the trial level. While each trial judge is
"an autonomous decisionmaking entity" appellate judges render decisions
collegially. I' "The most stable, certain, and predictable appellate arrangement
would be a court composed of permanently assigned judges, all of whom sit
on each appeal. The farther we move away from that model, the greater risk
of eroding those qualities.""
The addition of judges increases bureacracy and diminishes collegiality.
The multiplication of judicial decision-making units decreases uniformity. In
the Eighth District Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, there are nine active
judges.II There are eighty-four possible combinations of judges, not including
retired judges, trial judges sitting by assignment, and visiting panels.' 3 In such
a system it is inevitable that there should be conflicting decisions. The problem
is aggravated by the fact that Ohio, unlike the federal system, has no provision
for en banc review by the entire court. Moreover, it would appear that the process
by which court of appeals decisions are certified to the Ohio Supreme Court
applies only to conflicts between appellate districts and not between panels
within the same district.'" One ultimate effect is to place increased stress upon
the Ohio Supreme Court to watch for inconsistencies within multiple-panel
districts, as well as for conflicts between the districts themselves.
As Daniel Meador has counseled, "[d]angerous consequences may follow,
just as they may in a period of unrestrained economic inflation, if the inflation
in caseloads and [judicial] personnel remains unchecked .... I I One of those
consequences is that: "Over the long run, augmenting judicial capacity may
erode the distinctive contribution the courts make to the social order. The danger
is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institu-
tions, may become altogether too much like them."'"
III. INCREASING COURT EFFICIENCY
As Thomas Marvel indicates, the use of case-management techniques is
'Lumbermen's Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurther, J., concurring). These
sentiments are shared by many, including the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Tamm & Reardon, Warren E. Burger and the Administration of Justice, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 447,493.
"See generally McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 782-84 (1981).
"Meador, supra note 5, at 642.
"Id.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.01-01.2 (Page 1981).
"Meador, supra note 5, at 644.
1
4See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3 (B) (4).
"Meador, supra note 5, at 618.
"Shattuck & Norger, Political Uses of the Legal Process by Black and American Indian Minorities, 22
How. L. REv. 1. 23 (1979).
[Vol. 16:1
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currently a "popular" response to growing caseloads. 7 Yet, he concludes that
such techniques are "of little or no use in reducing the substantial backlogs
that result from caseload growth .... ". In addition to the weaknesses of this
approach,' 9 one should not lose sight of the fact that taking steps beyond case-
management techniques to alter the traditional appellate process may adverse-
ly affect the effectiveness of the Court itself: "Legal institutions are simply
not effective, not efficient ... unless they manage at least to create legitimacy." 2
Legitimacy is maximized when judges approach their work with the high aspira-
tions articulated by former Justice Stewart:
I think it is very important for a judge - any judge anywhere -
to remember that every case is the most important case in the world for the
people involved in that case, and not to think of a case as a second-class
case or a third-class case or an unimportant case. It behooves a judge or
a justice to apply himself fully to every case and to give it conscientious
consideration.2 '
This type of consideration, and the corresponding legitimacy that comes with
it, may be impossible under the pressures of many of the reforms advocated
for the appellate courts:
If we force our judges to become mass production workers rather
than craftpersons, our citizens will inevitably lose respect for the process.
An assembly line concept has no place in a judiciary whose members take
pride in the quality and craft of their work.... We have come to terms
with an ever-increasing caseload, but we must be careful that our answer
does not bring efficiency at the expense of a fair hearing.22
One of the difficulties of an increasing caseload and bureaucratic responses
to that case load is the opportunity for error increases without individual
attention to each case. In many instances the errors may be both correctable
and understandable. An incomplete footnote is attributed to a failure of the
United States Supreme Court's word processor;23 the Court receives, but
misplaces, all of the copies of a petition for rehearing;" or orders are issued
"Marvell, supra note 3, at 44.
'1Id.
"Id. at 44-49.
"Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981). This same idea was
expressed by Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court in slightly different terms: "[T]o the
extent that efficiency stresses weighted workloads and judicial man-hours over the people who are being
affected, to the extent that the system rewards the processing of cases as opposed to a concern for people,
the economic benefits of such sufficiency may in a larger sense be outweighed by the social costs." Bird,
Courts, Community and Individual Rights, JuDGEs' J., Spring 1982, at 8, 10.
"Justice Potter Stewart: An Interview, Reflecting on the Court, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL July 12,
1982, at 20 (emphasis added).
"Address by Rose Elizabeth Bird, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, International Academy
of Trial Lawyers Annual Convention (January 23, 1978) quoted in Gazell, Chief Justice Rose Bird: A
Two-Year Performance Review, 1980 DEr. C.L. REv. 419.
"See Correction, 51 U.S.L.W. 3005 (1982).
"4Perini v. Bell, No. 80-1430, one of three cases decided in Engle v. Isaac - U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 1558
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indicating that a case is dismissed for lack of a timely notice of appeal that
should be applicable not to the case in which the order was issued but to another
case.25 How does one assess the significance of these mistakes? Does the fact
that small errors are made mean that large ones are made too?
26
Similarly the use of form entries contribute to suspicion about the individual
attention given to cases. For example, when one is denied a discretionary appeal
in the Ohio Supreme Court two entries are received. One indicates that the
motion for leave to certify the record is overruled, and the other indicates that
the case is dismissed for want of a substantial constitutional question. Does
the latter order really mean what it says? Is the Court actually deciding the
case upon the merits or only using discretion to deny review?27
Attempts to increase the efficiency of a given court, by definition, increases
the work-load of already busy judges. In order to cope with that workload judges
must limit their own personal attention to the cases and increasingly rely upon
other court personnel, form entries, and machines. This, in turn, increases the
opportunity for error not only in technical matters but also in substantive matters
where the error is much more likely to go undetected.
IV. PREHEARING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
Messrs. Parness and Reagle advocate the use of Ohio Appellate Rule 20
to implement procedures prior to the hearing of a case in the Ohio Court of
Appeals which might lead to settlement without adjudication.28 Such procedures
could be implemented without changing the nature of the adjudicatory process
itself. By utilizing court staff or retired judges, procedures could be
implemented without any significant diversion of scarce judicial resources.
The fact that an amicable settlement may provide a more satisfactory resolution
than a winner-take-all result from the court makes this an alluring proposal.
Credence is added to the proposal by the apparent enthusiasm of those who
have first-hand experience in similar programs, including the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,2 9 and the Eighth District Ohio Court
(1982). The author, counsel for Mr. Bell, had a certified receipt from the United States Post Office and
the Supreme Court Marshall's Office indicating that the Court had received the petition. However, it had
never been docketed and, upon inquiry as to the status of the petition, could not be located. The personnel
of the clerk's office were most courteous and helpful in accepting additional copies of the petition and
bringing the matter to the court's conference at the earliest possible date.
"The cover letter was for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case No. 82-3082, Payne
v. Janasz, while the entry was for case No. 82-3080, Everette v. Marshall. Again, the clerk's office was
most helpful in correcting the error.
2 That may be an unfair approach, but it is certainly one which the legal profession adopts in many of
its dealings. For example, it is assumed that a person who would lie on a small matter would also lie on
a large one. It is assumed that a person who would cheat the government on income taxes would also
cheat his/her clients and hence is not a person to properly be a member of the bar.
"Analogous problems exist with practice before the United States Supreme Court with the distinction
between decisions upon appeal and denials of certiorari. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 327-30, 353-60, (5th ed. 1978).
2'Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 15-24.
"In January of 1982 the Sixth Circuit implemented an "experimental program" to effect settlements in
[Vol. 16:1
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of Appeals.3"
It is therefore relatively easy to support the proposal in principle and to
agree that an experimental program should be initiated to test its efficacy. At
the same time, candor requires acknowledgment of the fact that it would be
surprising if such a program resulted in the "significant" reduction in the number
of adjudicated cases contemplated by Messrs. Reagle and Parness. 3' The even-
handed critique of existing programs by Thomas Marvell points out the
difficulties in assessing their productivity. 3 2 It also suggests that there is reason
to believe that their contribution to case load reduction may not be statistically
significant and, in fact, may have the effect of increasing the number of appeals. 33
One reason for skepticism about the ability of such settlement programs
to accomplish major results is a feeling that the maximum institutional forces
for compromise coalesce in the trial court. Prior to trial there is great uncertainty
as to the result. The vagaries of juries are well known and even when one's
subjective judgment would suggest that one party may prevail, the level of
uncertainty still remains high. In contrast, the level of uncertainty in the inter-
mediate court of appeals is diminished by the statistics which indicate that the
overwhelming number of judgments below are affirmed.3 ' Generally, the
appellee can approach the court of appeals with a certain amount of confidence
that as long as he or she makes no fatal admissions, the judgment won below
will be affirmed.33
Second, no matter what the expense of preparing for an appeal, it is likely
to be relatively small compared to the expense that was devoted to trial. Conse-
quently, to the extent that economic considerations create pressure to settle,
that pressure is generally greater at trial than on appeal.3 6
non-criminal cases. Two of the court's staff lawyers were assigned to work on this program. UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1982). During the first six months
of the program fourteen cases were settled. This amounted to one percent of all cases disposed of for
the entire year. Id. at 12. If the settlement rates were to remain constant for an entire year one could
project a two percent settlement rate. Though this seems relatively modest in comparison to the number
of cases dismissed for want of prosecution (seven percent) and voluntarily dismissed (seventeen percent),
Chief Judge George Edwards is enthusiastic about the program. Remarks of the Chief Judge at the 1982
Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference, Asheville, North Carolina (July 15, 1982).
"Day, supra note 7, at 38.
"Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 20.
2Marvell, supra note 3, at 77-84.
"SMarvell, supra note 3, at 81.
"For example, in the United States Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit the affirmance
rate is said to be eighty-three percent .Wald, Become a Real "Friend of the Court, " AM. PSYCHOLOGY
A. MONITOR Feb. 1982 at 5.
"There may be an exception if appellee's counsel believes that there is error in the record. However, skillful
counsel would generally have helped protect the record in the trial court and thereby avoided any such
error. Unskillful counsel is unlikely to recognize its existence on appeal. Consequently, these instances
are probably statistically small.
"There may be instances in which the appealing parties simply exhaust their finances and cannot support
even the smaller cost of pursuing the appeal. There may also be situations in which the personal finances
of the parties change during the appellate process and create strong incentive for settlement. However,
these are probably the exceptions rather than the rule.
Summer, 1982]
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Third, the trial judge is likely to have much more influence upon the party
in the settlement process than a judge of the court of appeals. By scheduling
status calls, prehearing conferences, and the trial itself the trial court has the
ability - whether intended or not - to put tremendous pressure upon the parties
to settle the case. Further, by ruling upon pretrial motions, the court may not
only narrow the issues for trial but give the parties important signal, as to the
possible outcomes if the case proceeds to judgment. This, in and of itself,
may change the bargaining position of the parties and create strong incentives
for settlement.
In contrast, the only leverage the Court of Appeals has is to threaten one
party or the other with the loss of the case. Assuming that the assessment is
made by a judge who will not participate in the final decision, it is simply his
or her view of what three other colleagues may eventually do. While this
informed opinion may put that judge in a position to make a reasonable assess-
ment of the case's probable outcome, an attorney who regularly practices before
the court and who has more carefully read recent case law on the issue may
be in as good a position to make a similar judgment. Moreover, such a tactic
would work only in those cases in which it was going to be indicated that the
appellant might win. Obviously, to indicate that the appellee would probably
prevail would not give any encouragement to the settlement process.
Added to these institutional factors is the consideration that if a trial judge
has been concerned about his or her docket, extended efforts were probably
already made to settle the case. Though there may certainly be new considera-
tions that arise once the judgment is rendered, one must acknowledge that the
appellate settlement process will, to some extent, be repetitious of that which
has proceeded it. This prior consideration reduces the statistical likelihood of
a settlement once the case is in the court of appeals.
Similarly, most attorneys have some sense of the strengths and weaknesses
of their cases and the potential for settlement - even on appeal. Skillful counsel
will themselves consider and discuss such prospects as evidenced by the fact
that cases are settled or dismissed even in courts which do not have these pro-
cedures. The mediation process probably affects only those attorneys who have
not already given independent consideration to such a settlement prospect. These
are the very attorneys who may be less likely to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases and less likely to be amenable to the settlement process.
As Messrs. Parness and Reagle note, such a procedure was in effect for
a time in at least one district of the Ohio Court of Appeals but abandoned
due to "manpower restrictions."" It appears to have been the judgment of the
majority of the judges of that court that the time expended in conducting the
settlement conferences exceeded the time saved by the settlement of those cases.
While the experience of one court, over a relatively short period of time, does not
"Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 19.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss1/7
INTEGRITY OF OHIO APPELLATE SYSTEM
suggest that the proposal of Messrs. Parness and Reagle should not be con-
sidered; it does suggest that caution should be used in the mechanics of any
program that is implemented.
Of equal concern is the cost of such programs. Judge Day suggests that
financing is "no insuperable problem."" However, Messrs. Parness and Reagle
assert that in order to "be viable" counsel would be required to file some form
of prehearing statement for either a determination as to whether the settlement
conference was proper or for use in the conference itself.39 On its face, the re-
quired filing of one additional document in an appeal does not appear to be
excessive. However, in a complex case it can take several hours to fill out a
prehearing conference form. Moreover, it certainly takes attorney-time to consult
one's client about settlement prospects and to physically attend the hearing.
It is somewhat ironic that Messrs. Parness and Reagle would oppose a
quadrupling of the filing fee for an appeal as was proposed in the State of
Washington"0 and yet would imose even greater costs upon the parties through
the use of pre-hearing conferences. If one were to posit relatively modest fees
of $25 for one-half hour of work in preparing the prehearing conference state-
ment and $75 for attendance at the prehearing conference, this would itself
be equivalent to a three-fold increase in a $50 filing fee for the appellant.4 '
It would result in an additional $100 of expense for the appellee. If increasing
the filing fee would have the same comparable effect on case-load reduction
as the prehearing conference, then the latter may well be the more desirable
solution since it results in no underlying expenditure of judicial or attorney time.
Both the theoretical concept of the prehearing settlement conference and
the enthusiasm of many of those who participated in that process suggests that
it should be given serious consideration. But experience suggests that such a
program is unlikely to be a panacea for the case-load problems of the appellate
system.
V. LIMITING ORAL ARGUMENT
The literature debating the merits of alternatives to the traditional appellate
oral argument is voluminous and any serious discussion of the Ohio appellate
procedures should properly include consideration of that issue. Professor Parness
and Mr. Reagle suggest that judicial resources can be conserved by reducing
the number of cases in which oral argument is had. Judge Moyer's position
is summed up by the title of his article: Oral Argument - Let It Be,"2 and
seems to be shared by both Judge Day and Mr. Marvell.43 These conflicting
"Day, supra note 7, at 38.
"Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 16.
"Id. at 15.
"The filing fee for appeals varies from a low of $25.00 in the Second District, Local Rule 1, to $50.00
in the Eighth District, Local Rule 3.
4 2Moyer, Oral Argument - Let It Be, 16 AKRON L. REv. 103 (1982).
41Day, supra note 7, at 40; Marvell, supra note 3, at 60-62. Though Judge Black does not discuss this
Summer, 1982]
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views raise a number of important issues which bear exploration."
Professor Parness and Mr. Reagle suggest that oral argument in Ohio is
"simply a matter of policy." 5 However, as they note," the Ohio Constitution
specifically provides that in districts where the total number of judges exceeds
three judges, "... . three judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition
of each case."" 7 Reference to "the" hearing and the use of the conjunctive
"and" to separate the hearing aspect of the case from its disposition suggests
that the oral argument is required. This interpretation is reinforced by reference
to the provision of the Constitution which requires that a majority of the judges
"hearing the cause shall be necessary to render a judgment. "" Though the matter
may not be entirely free from debate, these provisions, on their face, suggest
that there is a state constitutional right to oral argument. 9
Nor is the result necessarily any different under the federal constitution.
As to the right of appeal itself, the American Bar Association has suggested
that there may be a federal constitutional basis for claiming the right to a first
appeal.5" Indeed, there seems to be developing at least a rudimentary right of
issue in his Symposium article, he has indicated that oral argument is "important"; that one "should
never underestimate the impact of face-to-face contact with the judges who are going to make the decision";
and that oral argument is "always worthwhile if the appeal has any value at all or if the result is in doubt."
Remarks of Judge Robert Black, Ohio Appellate Practice Seminar, Ohio State Bar Association Convention
(May, 1982).
"In part, one's view of oral argument may depend upon the role one plays in the appellate process. For
example, one judge indicated that while acting as a lawyer he or she believed oral argument was a "right"
in every case, but as a judge he or she "knows" that oral argument cannot be given in every case. Wasby,
Oral Argument in the Ninth Circuit: The View from Bench and Bar 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 21, 28
(1981).
"Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 25-26.
"Id. at note 162.
7OHIo CONST. art. IV § 3 (A) (emphasis added).
"Id. § 3 (B) (3) (emphasis added). This language was added when the Ohio Constitution was amended
effective May 7, 1968. The former language, which was contained in article IV, § 6, read: "Only a majority
of such Court of Appeals shall be necessary to pronounce a decision, make an order or enter judgment,
upon all other questions. . . ." Constitution, State of Ohio (1979) (former provisions of the Constitution
of Ohio, 1851, at 309, 316).
"There is no reported case law upon this provision. However, local rule 2 of the Second Appellate Judicial
District, adopted September 1, 1976, purports to preclude oral argument in criminal cases "except upon
written motion supported by good cause." If this rule is enforced in such a manner as to preclude oral
argument when requested it would squarely present the question of whether the rule could stand against
the provisions of the Ohio Constitution as interpreted in the text above. There is at least one decision
concerning the constitutional provisions, case law, statutes, and rules of court of another jurisdiction which
holds that an appellant in a criminal case does have the right to have oral argument. People v. Brigham,
25 Cal.3d 283, 599 P.2d 100, 157 Cal.Rptr. 905 (1979).
"The commentary to § 1.1 of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON APPEALS (Approved Draft
1970) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS] states:
Whether or not the right to appeal is now secured under the Constitution, there is no
disagreement today on the wisdom of providing a system of appeals in criminal cases. "Justice
demands an independent and objective assessment of a district judge's appraisal of his own conduct
of a criminal trial." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1962) (Stewart, J., concurring)
. .."Appellate review has become such an integral part of our criminal procedure that it may
properly be viewed as an extension of the trial itself." Commonwealth ex rel. Neal v. Myers, 424
Pa. 576, 579 n. 3, 227 A.2d 845, 846, n. 3 (1967).
While acknowledging that there are no cases indicating that due process requires a first appeal as
of right, the commentary to § 3.10 of the AMERICAN BAR ASSocIATION COMMISSION ON STANDARDS
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appellate review for individuals who have been sentenced to death." Further,
it is entirely possible that in attempting to create classes of cases in which no
appeal will be allowed the mandate of the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause would be violated. 2
It is, of course, quite different to maintain that the Constitution mandates
an appeal as opposed to arguing that it mandates oral argument in such an
appeal. But while the adoption of United States Circuit Court rules treating
oral argument as a discretionary measure may portend poorly for the outcome
of any constitutional challenge, it certainly does not provide its own judicial
warrant for the actions taken. Unconstitutional actions do not gain constitu-
tional stature by repetition or prescription.II It may well be that oral argument
has become such a part of tradition of this country that it is now protected
under fourteenth amendment procedural or substantive due process.
In focusing upon the policy questions raised by Messrs. Parness and Reagle,
a beginning point is to examine the views of those who are participants in the
appellate process. The American Bar Association has generally opposed the
curtailment of oral argument.54 Both Judge Day and Judge Moyer have set
forth in explicit terms their reasons for wanting to maintain oral argument in
the Ohio system as it presently exists." If I read correctly the results of the
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS (Approved Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS] nevertheless concludes that the right of appeal "is a fundamental element of procedural
fairness as generally understood in this country."
The concept of one appeal from each final judgment is advocated by the STANDARDS RELATING TO
CRIMINAL APPEALS, § 1.1 (a) (Approved Draft 1970) and, at least in this century, has been considered part
of the "accepted model" for "fair" appellate procedure. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 22 (1981).
As Messrs. Parness and Reagle note, supra note 6, at 6, n. 26, there is authority within Ohio suggesting
that the state constitution guarantees the right of a first appeal. State v. Nickles, 159 Ohio St. 353, 112
N.E.2d 531 (1953); Haas v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Ohio St. 137, 115 N.E. 1020 (1916).
"See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
"For example, if the proposed appellate scheme allowed appeals in civil cases even though they might
involve a relatively small amount of money, and denied appeals in felony cases, when the individual's
liberty was at stake, could it pass muster under even the low-tier rationality test of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause? Though it is true that past equal protection cases concerning appellate
procedures have been concerned with the comparison within the "class" of criminal appeals, e.g., Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), this does not automatically
mean that a distinction between criminal and civil cases provides a rational classification scheme for all
purposes. See, e.g., Funkhuser v. Randolph, 287 Ill. 94, 122 N.E. 144 (1919) (Statute allowing only plaintiffs
to seek appellate review of findings of fact was invalid).
"State ex. rel. M'Cready v. Hunt, 15 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 291, 501 (1834) ("[However venerable the error
may be and however often it may have been repeated, it must fall before the Constitution .. "); CBS
v. Dem. Nat. Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 204 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) "[W]e must not equate what
is habitual with what is right or what is constitutional.").
"Section 3.35 of the STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS supra note 50, (Approved Draft 1977),
while making allowing allowances for exceptions, indicates that generally "[a] party to an appeal should
have the opportunity for oral argument .. " The commentary to that section begins by expressing the
opinion that "[ojral argument is normally an essential part of the appellate process." See also resolution
adopted by the House of Delegates in August, 1974, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE
ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUDGE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 77
(1977).
"Mr. Marvell's analysis of the benefits and detriments of curtailing oral argument would seem to support
the positions taken by Judges Day and Moyer. Marvell, supra note 3, at 60-62.
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survey conducted by Professor Parness and Mr. Reagle, this is an accurate reflec-
tion of the position of the majority of appellate judges in the State of Ohio.
5 6
Other surveys indicate that judges are more prone to favor the elimina-
tion of oral argument than lawyers." Given the fact that counsel retain the
power to waive oral argument under the existing system, it is predictable that
a survey of counsel who regularly practice before the Ohio Court of Appeals
would produce an even higher consensus opposing the proposed discretionary
oral argument. Indeed, in other jurisdictions counsel have indicated a willingness
to accept even further delays in the time required for decision rather than give
up oral argument.58
The assault upon oral argument is justified, primarily, in terms of scarce
judicial resources. Judge Day has indicated that in actuality the hearings for
oral argument "take up very little of judicial time"59 and Mr. Marvell has con-
cluded that the savings from curtailing oral argument is "rather slight."
60 If
it were assumed that court discretion to deny oral argument would reduce the
number of arguments by one half,61 and if it were assumed that no judicial
time would be lost in determining which cases would receive oral argument and
which would not,62 then the savings to each Ohio appellate judge would be
approximately seven work days.63 If each of Ohio's fifty-two appellate judges
could author an additional decision for each of the gained seven days, it would
still result in the disposition of slightly less than give percent of the cases pend-
"In examining their text and footnotes 163-70, it appears that 24 judges responded to the survey. It appears
that 12 of those judges indicated that oral argument should be provided subject to waiver by counsel;
three judges thought that oral argument should be discretionary with the Court in certain types of cases;
and one judge thought that counsel should have the right to argument if they could prove a "reason" for it.
"Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of Lawyers and Federal
Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 348-52 (1982).
"See generally Wasby, supra note 44, at 73, where, after considering the results of surveys and writings
in the areas, the author summarizes the findings by indicating lawyers wanted both oral argument and
written opinions "even if it meant that more time would be consumed by cases ... roughly seventy-five
to eighty percent of the attorneys were willing to wait longer... to obtain the traditional practices" (footnotes
omitted). Similarly, in response to a questionnaire from the Appellate Judges Conference of the A.B.A.'s
Judicial Administration Division, the lawyer's responses under the heading of "oral argument" focused,
inter alia, upon complaints about the limitations upon oral argument and the court's "discouraging" of
oral argument. Attachment, "Problems Observed in the Appellate Courts," to letter from Edward J.
Schenbaum to Richard L. Aynes (October 15, 1981).
"Day, supra note 7, at 40.
"Marvell, supra note 3, at 61. See also R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1981)
and commentary to § 3.35 of the STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 50, (Approved
Draft 1977) at 56.
"This is probably a high estimate because some cases are currently submitted on briefs without oral argument;
and, given the strong support for oral argument among members of the bench and bar, it is likely that
the court would be generous in granting oral argument when sought.
"This assumption is probably incorrect. If that decision-making responsibility were totally delegated to
the court staff, then it would be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. Any other solution requires
at least some judicial time in making the decisions as to which cases deserve oral argument.
"This figure is based on one-half hour of oral argument for 270 cases to be heard on a yearly basis. The
average appellate judge's work-week is calculated at 50 hours. (It was limited to that number only because
I suspect that many members of the bar and public would not believe the number of hours that appellate
judges actually work.)
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ing at the end of 1980.64 Even if these figures are reasonable approximations,
they suggest a very slight benefit could be gained by placing further restric-
tions upon oral argument. Of course, even slight benefits are welcome. If this
decrease could be obtained without any cost to the essential functions of the
appellate courts, then it would provide its own justification. But, the relevant
question is whether the benefits lost outweigh the benefits to be gained.
Along with the benefits of oral argument outlined by Judges Moyer and
Day can be added the following:
[Oiral argument is the absolute indispensable ingredient of appellate
advocacy.... Often my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes
in a direct way with counsel available to correct error. Some judges
assimilate ideas more readily by oral than by written transmission; and
some ideas are more readily transmitted by oral means. Thus, the quality
of decisions is likely to be enhanced.
Oral argument is important as a means of giving judges a continuing
awareness of their relationship and dependence on others; without it, the
judge is isolated from all but a limited group of subordinates. It is an im-
portant assurance both in fact and in appearance, that decisions are made
collectively, because it is the occasion when all the judges responsible for
the decision address themselves together and in public view. Oral argu-
ment gives to litigants the assurance that the judges themselves are mak-
ing the decision. And it also gives litigants the sense of participation which
is an essential of the adversary tradition. 5
The effect of oral argument upon the legitimacy of the court's decision-making
power may be particularly important since the "accepted model for fair appellate
procedure" includes the entitlement to present oral argument to the court. 66
To this, one might add that oral argument does, on occasion, actually
change the views of the court. 67 Justice Brennan has indicated that:
"Messrs. Parness and Reagle in the text at note 39 indicate that at the close of 1980, 5,290 were pending.
Actually, these calculations inflate the effect of the elimination of argument since they use 1982 figures
for the number of judges and 1980 figures for the number of cases pending.
"P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG. JUSTICE ON APPEAL 17-18 (1976). A good summary of
the benefits of oral argument is also found at Washy, supra note 44, at 32-40.
66R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1981).
6Though almost everyone would agree that this may occur on occasion, the significant question is how
great is the frequency. Judge Myron H. Bright of the Eighth Circuit United States Court of Appeals indicates
that in one session of his court where he kept a record, it affected approximately 30 percent of the cases.
Bright, The Ten Commandments of OralArgument 67 A.B.A.J. 1136, 1139 (1981). Judge Engle of the
Sixth Circuit indicates that 10 percent is the figure "most frequently mentioned among judges and law
clerks." Engle, Oral Advocacy at the Appellate Level, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 463, 471 (1981). Judge Coffin
of the First Circuit and Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit placed the figure at somewhere between five
and ten percent. See Oakes, On the Craft and Philosophy of Judging 80 MICH. L. REv. 579, 584 (1982).
Judge Malcolm Wilkey has estimated that in about one fourth of the cases he could estimate in advance
that the arguments would be helpful, even though one-half turned out to be helpful. Wasby supra note
44, at 33. Judge Black has indicated that oral argument is important in every case where the result is in
doubt that he has had his opinion changed by what took place in the oral argument. Supra note 43.
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[O]ral argument is the absolutely dispensable ingredient of appellate
advocacy.... Often my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes
at oral argument. This happens even though I read the briefs before oral
argument .... Often my idea of how a case shapes up is changed by oral
argument .... 68
It is considerations such as these, and not simply a devotion to the status
quo, that provide the basis for the continuing support for maintaining the right
of oral argument in every case before the state Court of Appeals. Nevertheless,
even those who support the continuation of oral argument may still lament
what is perceived as the low level of performance by counsel in presenting the
argument. 69 Since this condition often provides a basis to attack existing pro-
visions for oral argument, this issue also bears exploration.
One possibility is that the quality of advocacy really has not changed but
rather is the pro.duct of the illusion of thinking back to good times past. Another
possibility is that the quality of advocacy is declining because the quality of
lawyers admitted to the bar is decreasing. Though my position as a faculty
member of a law school may affect my judgment, that judgment is, nevertheless,
that the quality has remained relatively the same over the past years and that
if there is anything recent graduates are prepared to do, it is appellate work.7"
This is one of those occasions in which I believe I know more than I can
prove. My supposition is that if there is a decline in quality in oral advocacy,
it is because counsel lack the will, and not the ability, to represent clients in
the manner in which the court would like. In making this suggestion, it is perhaps
proper to consider this claim first as applied to private counsel and second as
applied to institutional counsel.
"HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET No. 9, 22-23 (1967) quoted in Stern, supra note 66, at
358. For a collection of other accounts of the importance of oral argument see Stem, supra note 66, at 358-60.
"Robert Stern has noted that, "it seems that a large number of oral arguments are perceived to be
inadequate." R. STERN supra note 66, at 360. In speaking of arguments before the United States Supreme
Court Justice Douglas indicated that 40 percent of those presenting arguments were "incompetent." W.
0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 183 (1980). Chief Justice Burger has indicated that no more than 50 percent
of the lawyers in the United States were "competent" to handle an appeal. J. CAMERON, THE IMPROVEMENT
OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 204 (F. Klein 6th ed. 1981). See generally T. MARVELL, APPELLATE
COURTS AND LAWYERS 21-37 (1981).
It should also be noted that Chief Justice Berger was not the first judge who decried "the growing
tendencies to lower the standard of what was once properly termed a learned profession, by filling up
the roll with men of little elementary training and whose knowledge of the law was obtained from the
mere definitions and catch-words of a noble science." Judge Thompson Nixon quoted in Presser, Judicial
Ajax: Thompson Nixon in the Federal Courts of New Jersey in the late 19th Century, 76 N.W.U.L. REV.
423, 431 (1981).
"This view seems to be shared by a substantial number of members of the profession. As a result of a
recent "LawPoll" the A.B.A. Journal concluded that the perception is that "[l]awyers entering the legal
profession are better trained in law school than their counterparts of ten years ago." LawPoll, Well-trained,
but too many, 68 A.B.A.J. 1080 (1982). (But note that the breakdown of responses from the regular A.B.A.
members indicated that 30 percent thought the young lawyers were better trained than their counterparts
of ten years ago, while 49 percent thought their quality was "about the same.") Whatever the validity
of these perceptions, they should apply to appellate practice with greater force than other types of legal
work. In addition to the almost universal requirement of completing an appellate oral argument simulation,
the classroom methods of analyzing appellate cases should place every law graduate in the position of
being able to confidently prepare an appellate brief.
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As to private counsel, the quality of representation may be reflective of
societal changes away from law being what we used to call a "profession" and
towards being what we might call today a "business." Though some may think
those terms would be either positive or negative, they are not intended to con-
vey such connotations. Rather, they are intended to recognize that there has
been an apparent shift away from measuring one's success at the bar in terms
of reputation and estimation by one's peers to utilizing the amount of fees one
generates as an index of such success.71 As more members of the profession
gravitate toward the latter view it is predictable that the quality of advocacy
will depend more and more upon the client's ability to pay for such advocacy.
One may say that this is nothing new. However, there has been in times
past an atmosphere in which counsel's work in a given case might far exceed
his or her expected compensation because one's personal worth was intimately
connected with the work product. Today, it is more and more common to hear
counsel say that a given case may have warranted $10,000 worth of work; the
client had only $1,000; and consequently the appeal received only $1,000 worth
of work. This same principle obviously applies, a fortiori, in criminal cases
where counsel is appointed and cannot expect to receive compensation com-
mensurate with the work necessary for the preparation of detailed briefs and
an extended oral argument.7 1
With respect to institutional counsel, the result may be the same even though
not dictated by a fee schedule. Particularly in the larger offices, both the
prosecutor and the public defender may be plagued by problems that parallel
those of the court: the pressures of a heavy case load minimizes the time that
can be devoted to each case and increases bureaucracy within their own agency.
The end result is the efforts of counsel may be inadequate to assist the court
in resolving the issues before it.
This is often encouraged by the feeling that the result is inevitable. On
the state's side, the prosecutor may feel that the court will be reluctant to order
a new trial for a convicted felon and that the court and its staff will explore
every possibility for affirming the conviction, thereby making arduous work
by the state's advocate unnecessary. A similar feeling that there is an inevitable
result in most of the cases to which they are appointed may effect the public
defender.
"This trend was noted by Justice Ralph S. Locher of the Ohio Supreme Court: "Achievement is too often
measured in terms of dollars with money the end-all of effort. So, too, in our profession we equate success
with the size of the practitioner's bank account. I submit this equation represents a false sense of
values .. " Remarks to the Candidates for Admission to the Bar on November 6, 1981, reprinted in
54 OHIO BAR 2142 (Dec. 14, 198 1). See also Morrow, Have WeAbandoned Excellence, TIME 90(March 22,
1982) and Helpern, On the Political and Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 383, 390(1982).
"In Michigan litigation has been initiated to attempt to force the courts to adopt a "more reasonable"
fee schedule for appointed counsel. The complaint claims that the "underpayment of counsel creates a
risk of indigents receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and the loss of even the appearance of justice
for indigents." Michigan Lawyers Sue for Reasonable Fees, VI THE CHAMPION 1 (June, 1982). Similar
concerns have been expressed by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association with respect to theproposed use of competitive bidding to award contracts for indigent defense services. NLADA Assails
"Cheap Justice" in Contract Bid Programs, VI THE CHAMPION 2 (June, 1982).
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Having taken counsel to task, it is only fair to address a word or two to
members of the bench. Counsel are only two of the actors in the oral argu-
ment. The quality of that argument depends, in large part, upon the role taken
by members of the appellate bench. The more prepared and more active the
judges, the greater benefit the argument can have. By changing the argument
away from a lecture by counsel into a discussion of the issues among counsel
and the members of the court, the oral argument may produce creative resolu-
tions to issues which need to be addressed. But this presupposes that the judges
are already thoroughly familiar with the case; that they are willing to let counsel
know what issues they are troubled by; that they are willing to hazard tentative
positions, knowing full well that they may not be their final position upon any
given issue; and that they are willing even to disagree among themselves in the
dialogue that takes place in public.
Another possibility is that the quality of oral argument is diminished by
the court's restriction of oral argument time to unreasonable time periods -
such as fifteen minutes. We know, for example, that in the early days of the
United States Supreme Court there was no limitation on argument time. Until
this century, each side was often given two hours to present its case,73 and in
major cases several days were often devoted to oral argument.74 It is sometimes
suggested that this was so because counsel relied upon oral argument rather
than full briefs.7" However, at least by the latter part of the nineteenth century,
this was not true. Rather, in many of the major cases full briefs were presented
to the Court as well as multiple-day oral arguments.7"
One United States Court of Appeals Judge has contrasted the limited
amount of oral argument time in the court of appeals with the extended three-
to-four hours of arguments that he allowed as a District Judge and found the
former to be inadequate.77 The question we should ask ourselves is: Are we
so superior to those who preceded us that we can resolve a more complex case
in a better fashion by devoting less time and effort to it?
My own supposition is that while the abilities of the bench and bar are
perhaps improved they have not changed substantially and that we could benefit
by a return to longer oral arguments. While the reduction in oral argument
may have been a response to an increase in case load, it is also interesting to
note that that reduction parallels an increasingly technological society in which
everything from the telecast of war to the evening meal is instantaneous.7" I
"In 1849, the Court limited oral arguments to two hours per side. 7 How. IV (1849). This same amount
of time was alloted in the Ohio Supreme Court. Rule I1, 14 Ohio St. VI (1864).
1
4For example, the argument in Exparte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866) "ran from March 5 through
9, and was continued on March 12 and 13." Fairman, VI, Reconstruction and Reunion 143 (1971). Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868) received 12 hours of oral argument over 5 days. Id. at 451.
7Briefs were required beginning in 1821. 6 Wheat. V (1821).
"E.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
77Response to a survey quoted in Wasby, supra note 44, at 28.
"California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird has analyzed the cultural aspects of this phenomena. Bird,
The Idol of Instantaneousness, JuDGES' J., Fall 1982, at 7. Another manifestation of this development may
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suspect that culturally we have lost our patience for listening to others care-
fully and for thoroughly developing arguments in even important cases. It
appears that the reduction in oral argument is part of the quest for the "instant
judicial decision" as the companion of this morning's instant breakfast.
The curtailment or elimination of oral argument is not a proper cure for
problems that may be arising because of the volume of cases being filed in the
State Court of Appeals. Rather, Ohio should return to the day oral argument
was at least 30 minutes for each side as advocated by Section 3.35 of the A.B.A.
Standards Relating to Appellate Courts.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON BRIEFS
Like the reduction in oral argument, it is doubtful that reducing the number
of pages allowed for appellate briefs could result in any significant savings of
judicial time. 9 The average attorney already has significant incentives to pre-
sent the issues to the court in the most concise fashion that he or she deems
possible."0 Indeed, it appears that "the vast majority of briefs are far shorter
than the page limitations" currently imposed by the courts.8 ' Hence, the potential
savings is de minimis.
Further, like reducing oral argument to fifteen minutes, placing stringent
limitations on briefs may be counterproductive. For example, consider a ten-
page limitation on reply briefs.8 2 The appellee, by the injection of new issues,
citations of portions of the record not utilized in the appellant's brief, or use
be seen in the reports that the editors of READER'S DIGEST are publishing a "condensed" version of the
Bible. PARADE, September 17, 1981, at 12. William Safire analyzed the effect of this approach, writing:
The attention span of most Americans on serious matters is about 20 seconds, the length of
a television clip.
In the same way, people do not want to read articles as they once did; today, if you cannot
get it in a paragraph, forget it.
As a result, we're becoming a short-take society. Our Presidency is a forum for 30-second
spots. Our food for thought is junk food.
... as a people (we) are writing less and talking more. Because it takes longer to prepare your
thoughts on paper, that means we are adlibbing more, and it means we are thinking more super-
ficially .... Commencement address at Syracuse University, Spring, 1978, quoted in Davis,
"Editor's Viewpoint," 14 Law Notes for the General Practitioner I (Summer, 1978).
"The present Ohio Appellate Rules do not place any limitation upon the length of briefs. See O.R.A.P.
16. Some Courts have placed such limitations upon briefs by local rule, e.g., Eighth District Local Rule
6 (40 pages); Ninth District Local Rule 13.7 (30 pages), Tenth District Local Rule 6 (50 pages). Nationwide
the page limitations for opening briefs range from 25 to 100 (or none) with most seeming to fall in the
50-70 page range. See R. STERN, supra note 66, at 226-30.
"Institutional counsel, such as the Prosecutor's Office or the Public Defender's Office, have strong pressures
generated both from a realization that the court does not like long briefs and their own heavy case load.
Similarly, the rate of compensation for court appointed counsel in criminal cases provides a disincentive
for lengthly briefing of the case and makes it unlikely that any but the most diligent counsel will approach
the page limitation, unless compelled to do so by ethical considerations. Privately retained counsel who
take a given case, either upon a contingency or for a set fee, have strong interest in limiting the work
they put into an appellate brief. The only time in which counsel would have an incentive to write a longer
brief would be those billing upon an hourly basis. Of course, those working under the pressures of a heavy
caseload or the constraints of low fees may have a disincentive to edit and revise a brief in order to reduce
it to its most compact form.
"Marvell, supra note 3, at 67.
"E.g., Eighth Ohio Appellate District Local Rule 6.
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of new authorities can make an effective ten-page reply impossible. By forcing
counsel to summarize or abandon detailed argument the court may deprive itself
of both analysis and citations of relevant authority that counsel might have
otherwise provided. The end result may be that the judge and court staff may
have to conduct independent research that would otherwise be unnecessary.
VII. USE OF UNREPORTED OPINIONS
The unreported opinion problem is intimately related to Ohio's require-
ment, under Appellate Rule 12, that the Court of Appeals write upon each assign-
ment of error. In jurisdictions where there is no such requirement, the court,
by disposing of the case by simple journal entry, produces no opinion. Hence
there is no controversy over its lack of publication or its use as precedent.83
It is only when an explanation of the basis of the decision is written that a "pro-
blem" develops.
The existence of unreported opinions raises two separate and discrete issues.
First, opinions increase the volume of precedent. Though not advanced by any
of the participants in this Symposium, the call for limiting the increase of
authority is not a new one. Complaint was made against the "unmanageable
volume of authority and the unnecessary restatements of settled points of law."",
Justice McReynolds has been quoted as stating that "multiplied judicial
utterances have become a menance to order administration of the law. Much
would be gained if three-fourths (maybe nine-tenths) of those published in the
last twenty years were utterly destroyed."8 5
"An appropriate response to just such an order was:
THE AFFIRM-THE-ORDER, NO-OPINION BLUES
I got the Affirm the Order
No Opinion blues
The Appellate courts won't tell me why I lose
I wrote a brief like Darrow
And I cited Blackstone's law
But the Judges thought that Blackstone
Was a General in some war
I got the Affirm the Order
No Opinion blues
The phrases that they use have me confused
I'm going to write the Court Supreme
And I'll ask them what they mean
By their Affirm the Order
No Opinion ruse.
- Words and Music by W. F. Sutton (Circa 1966)
- Quoted in WHERE THE MONEY WAS by Willie Sutton with
Edward Linn (Viking Press, N.Y. 1976) 269.
"Seliugson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37 (1936).
"Quoted in Saeta, What Price Written Opinions, CAL. ST. B.J. 222,223 (1934). See WARREN, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERIcAN BAR 520 (1911) for a collection of quotations complaining about the increase of precedent.
See also FAMiAN, VI RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION. 1450-51 (1971).
Similar concerns have been expressed in modern times: "mhe value of using these unreported decisions
must be weighted against the costs to the practitioner and public in maintaining law libraries. Further,
one must consider the hours wasted by the courts and attorneys in researching hundreds of unreported
decisions of the courts of appeals" (footnote omitted). Shaw, The Legal Significance of the Unpublished
Court of Appeals Opinion in Ohio, 6 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 393, 399 (1977). Like objections are raised to
increasing the number of reported cases. After considering the costs of both publication and research time,
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One can argue that the cases are really not precedential; that the cases do
not measure up to standards for publication as precedential cases; and rules
can be made which attempt to prevent the use of such cases. s6 However, if the
cases were truly not precedential, then there would be no difficulty; a non-
precedential case would not be cited by the bar, or, if cited, could be easily
ignored. The difficulty stems from the fact that the cases are precedential and
that both the bar and the court recognize them as such.8" Consequently, alterna-
tives vary from requiring all cases to be published - an unrealistic solution
at the present - to suppressing precedent by the simple technique of not allowing
any opinions to be written. The latter can itself produce problems.
The lack of any opinion diminishes certainty.88 Counsel and his or her
client may not realize why they lost the case and may take further appeal that
otherwise would not be pursued. Similarly, even if the further appeal is inevitable,
without any guidance from the court as to why the appeal was lost, the appellant
may not be in a position to properly narrow the issues for the next stage of
review.
Moreover, without an opinion no one in a similar situation can receive
any guidance from the disposition of the case. The decision is akin to the
Supreme Court's use of a "balancing approach" - the application of the law
becomes less certain and it "becomes difficult to know how the case will be
decided... until the judge has ruled.... The decrease in certainty will produce
more litigation, and a greater proportion of litigated cases will be tried rather
than settled." 89
The second major issue concerning unreported opinions is the equal access
it has been suggested that "[it may cost more than it is worth to peruse 100 cases on the legal problems
of inspection at border crossings in order to be able to decide the 101st case." ABA TASK FORCE ON
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 
109
(1977).
"An example of this approach is found in Cameron, The Improvement of the Administration of Justice,
see CAMERON, supra note 69, at 207, indicating that one result of "the large number of frivolous and
nonprecedent-creating decisions, was ... the authorization by court rule of memorandum decision(s);
that is, summary, usually nonpublished and noncitable, decisions of the appellate courts" (emphasis added).
Obviously if the decision was truly nonprecedent-creating there would be no need for a non-citation rule.
"The United States Supreme Court has recently even relied upon argument of counsel that were not made
as authority for supporting its conclusion. United States v. Ross, - U.S. - , 50 U.S.L.W. 4580,
4586 (1982) citing and quoting Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 88 (Marshall, C.J.).
For a criticism of this approach see the dissent, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4591, n. 7.
"It has been suggested that the use of unreported opinions makes the law "less predictable" because the
discovery of unreported precedent may depend upon chance. Shaw, supra note 85, at 399-400. However,
with the advent of an adequate indexing system the chance may be no greater than that occasioned with
using the digests to discover reported authority. Moreover, as set forth in the text above, the Shaw's
proposition appears to be incorrect. A court of appeals which has decided a case - albeit in an unreported
opinion - is unlikely to adopt a different rationale in the succeeding case even if it is prohibited from
citing or relying upon its prior case. The fact that the case cannot be specifically called to the court's
attention does not mean that the court will either change its reasoning or forget that it has decided the
case. Hence, access to such a precedent by counsel would actually increase predictability and perhaps
eliminate certain appeals that might be doomed to failure. On the other hand, suppression of such cases
as precedent would remove incentive to discover those decisions, increase uncertainty, and give incentive
to appeals that might not otherwise be taken.
"Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 810 n. 22 (1982).
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to those opinions. As Judge Black indicates, it has sometimes been thought
that certain counsel - such as government agencies - may have an unfair
advantage in obtaining access to unpublished opinions.9" Though this may have
been a problem at one time, the access issue would now seem to be a moot
one in the State of Ohio.
My colleague, Paul Richert, has traced the development from the late 1970's
of various indexes that have been published to both criminal and civil unreported
cases from the Court of Appeals in Ohio. 91 Though Professor Richert initially
proposed that access to unreported cases could be had through computer assisted
legal research data bases,92 he also developed the idea that these opinions could
be placed on microfiche and made available to the public. The latter sugges-
tion has been adopted by the Banks-Baldwin Publishing Company which is
marketing cumulative indexes and making available the full text of the
unreported opinions.93 In this fashion, either by subscribing to the fiche editions
and reading each case individually or by using the marketed indexes, everyone
is guaranteed equal access to the same opinion.9"
This leaves only the question of how such opinions should be presented
to the court. The rule advocated by Judge Black and currently in effect in the
Eighth District Court of Appeals95 requires that counsel seeking to use any
unreported case attach a copy to his or her brief. This seems to be an adequate
way to insure that the court and opposing counsel have convenient access to
the opinion.9 6 It may well be that the use of microfiche or computer-based
research will so increase that at some time in the future this requirement will
no longer be necessary.
"Black, Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109 (1982). See also Shaw, supra note
85, at 399.
"Richert, Update on Ohio Judicial Reporting, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 680-81 (1980). In addition to thoseindexes, the Ohio Department of Administratiave Services has published an unreported case service of
significant civil service cases in Ohio from 1970 to the present. See letter from Jonathon J. Downes, LegalCounsel, Ohio Department of Administrative Services to Paul Richert (May 20, 1982). (Copy on file with
the author.)
"'Id. at 682.
"See generally ORAL News Letter at 6: The Door to Ohio Appellate Decisions Opens, (May, 1982); LawLibrary Microform Consortium, 1982 Catalog at 45 and, e. g., Banks/Baldwin ad 55 Ohio Bar (Inside
cover) June 14, 1982.
"However, there may still be some inequality in terms of the timing. Counsel who litigate in a certain
area and whose office accumulates a large number of opinions may have access to them sooner than other
members of the bar.
"Local Rule 19.
"At least with respect to informing any given court of appeals of the existence of its own unreported
cases counsel may already under a duty to take some action in that regard: "In presenting a matter to
a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the
position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel." Ohio Code of ProfessionalResponsibility DR 7-106(B) (1) (Adopted October 5, 1970). This is identical to the provisions of
the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility.
Though DR 7-106 is contained under the title "Trial Conduct" it would seem to be equally applicable
to appellate practice. See generally Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 (A) (5) and (7).
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VII. DETERMINATIONS AS TO WHICH OPINIONS SHOULD BE REPORTED
Judge Black has made a significant contribution to the improvement of
the Ohio appellate system by highlighting the underpublication of decisions of
the intermediate state Courts of Appeals. 97 In his article for this Symposium
he features Ohio Appellate Rule 2598 as proposed by the Ohio Court of Appeals
Judges Association.99 That proposal would not only adopt standards for the
publication of opinions, but would also provide a formalized procedure under
which counsel could request publication of an opinion through the court and
under which the reporter of the Supreme Court could determine which opinions
should actually be published.
While acknowledging the salutory effects of the proposed rule, there is
nevertheless the possibility that it could be improved. For example, section (B)
of the proposed Rule vests with the supreme court reporter the power to refuse
to officially publish a decision certified for publication by the appellate court.
This is a departure from the current requirement.
The reporter, while selected by the Supreme Court, is actually the reporter
for all the appellate courts of the state.'10 The statute requires that the reporter
publish the decisions of any court of appeals "furnished him for publication
by any such court . . 101 As Judge Black has indicated, 0 " this language would
appear to create a duty for the court reporter to publish all opinions that are
referred to him or her by the court.' 3
The continuation of a policy under which judges, as opposed to the reporter,
have the ability to require the publication of opinions they deem important
is a beneficial one. The drawback occasioned by a possible lack of objectivity
in judging the importance of one's own work is more than offset by the more
informed decision-making that comes from being more intimately familiar with
both the case itself and the likelihood that the nature of the litigation within
a given appellate district is such as to make the case important to members
of that community.
The current statute requires that a majority of the judges certify an opinion
"Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio 50 U. OF CIN. L REV. 477 (1981).
"The full text of the rule is set forth in note 27 of Judge Black's article.
"Black, supra note 90, at 112.
"0*OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (Page 1981) Historically, the office of reporter was held by eminent
counsel. Reverdy Johnson was a reporter of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. BROcarr,
MEN OF OUR DAY, 345 (1868). Edwin Stanton was chosen by the General Assembly of Ohio as a reporter
for the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, Id. at 201, and Jeremiah S. Black was the reporter for several
years for decisions of the United States Supreme Court, FAIRMAN, VI RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 
71
(1971).
Ohio has continued this tradition by appointing an able attorney, Walter S. Kobalka, as its reporter.
Mr. Kolbalka assumed the duties of that office August 2, 1982.
101Id.
"'Black, supra note 97, at 481.
"'However, Judge Black indicates that the practice "is otherwise." Id.
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for publication. Proposed Appellate Rule 25(B) would perpetuate that practice.
An alternative proposal would be to allow any single judge to certify a deci-
sion for publication. Where the matter is one of simple disagreement, we see
the caliber of judges at their best when we have two individuals, each having
read the briefs and record, marshalling facts and law against each other in
their conflicting opinions. It is in this crucible of majority/dissenting opinions
that one can form the most accurate judgments as to the caliber of individual
judges and the quality of justice in a given case. Further, the prospects of a
dissent have always been thought to have been a check not only against super-
ficial reasoning, l'0 but also against any possible misconduct. "I Knowledge that
a dissenter would have the right to require publication of a given opinion would
serve the public interest in accountability without any appreciable adverse affects.
Of course, cases may arise where none of the judges desire publication
- but counsel does. This may simply reflect a difference of opinion as to the
significance of the case or it may be an attempt by counsel to bring into public
light an opinion which he or she thinks is deserving of critical comment.
Whatever the motive, the provisions of proposed Appellate Rule (C) would
make for an increasing number of motions to be filed in the Court of Appeals
at a time when most agree that judicial resources are scarce. It would seem
that a more appropriate process would be to allow the parties to petition the
court reporter directly for publication of a case not deemed publishable by the
court that authored it. This would give counsel an avenue to request publica-
tion from one not involved in the decision and hence create an additional check
and balance within the system.
These proposals would require the court reporter to publish all decisions
requested for publication by at least one judge but would leave the court reporter
free to publish additional opinions thought deserving of publication either upon
his or her own initiative or, after review, upon the request of any other person.
Such a process would enhance the accountability of the judiciary and serve the
public interest.
IX. WRITING ON EVERY ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
One of the signifcant features of the Ohio Appellate system is Ohio
Appellate Rule 12 (A) which provides, in part that "[all errors assigned and
"'Aynes, Much Ado About Nothing... 13 AKRON L. REV. 507, 518 n. 98 (1980). Similar views have been
expressed by Justice Rehnquist: "[T]he inevitable dissents generated by difficult cases are themselves aform of 'check and balance' within the federal judicial system itself." Rehnquist, AllDiscord, HarmonyNot Understood: The Performance of the Supreme Court of the United State, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 973, 986(1980). However, not everyone shares this view of the desirability of the dissent, and some have even
condemned it as a "menance to law and order." Lee, Dissenting Opinions, 2 JOHN MAR. L. Q. 404,405-06(1937). In contrast, Justice Douglas believed that "The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life
tolerable for a judge of an appellate court." W. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960).
""It is said, for example, that in one instance a majority of a California Appellate Panel reversed a decisionto have an opinion published in order to "suppress" a dissent they did not like. Andreani, Independent
Panels to Choose Publishable Opinions: A Solution to the Problems of California's Selective Publication
System, 12 PAC. L. J. 727, 733 (1981) citing L.A. Daily Journal, Oct. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
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briefed shall be passed upon by the court in writing, stating the reasons for
the court's decision as to each such error." Judge Day'I6 and Messrs. Parness
and Reagle'I1 advocate the abolition of this requirement upon the grounds that
it is an inefficient use of judicial resources. Because this rule is, in effect, the
only practical way to implement a requirement that the court give the parties
an opinion which is responsive to the issues presented on appeal, the real ques-
tion is the desirability of requiring the court to state its reasons for disposition
of a given case.' °8
The A.B.A. Standards for Appellate Courts indicate that a "reasoned ex-
planation should be given" for the court's resolution of any given case'"9 and
that "[elvery decision" should be supported by at least a "citation of autho-
rity or statement of grounds upon which it is based.'""I The rationale under-
lying the requirement of written opinions may be divided into three general
categories: 1) to preserve the integrity of the appellate process; 2) to enhance
the perception of the integrity of the appellate process; and 3) to assist others
in the judicial system.
The reliability of the decision-making process itself may be dependent upon
whether the judges of the court go through the process of writing out reasons
for a proffered decision. To resort to a frequently utilized analogy, the unwritten
judicial decision may be compared to a scientist's "hunch," with the written
opinion being the "experimentation" which demonstrates that the hunch was
or was not justified.'
The practical result of this is that a requirement to set forth written reasons
"not infrequently changes the results by forcing the judges to come to grips
with nettlesome facts or issues which their normal instincts would otherwise
cause them to avoid.'"" 2 The truth of this claim has been verified by historical
research concerning the conferences of the United States Supreme Court which
identifies numerous occasions in which the vote of particular Justices or the
Court, changed between the conference vote and the final release of a given
decision." 3 Further, the tale of the decision that "wouldn't write" is one that
"'Day, supra note 7, at 40.
107Parness & Reagle, supra note 6, at 29-31.
"'There is, obviously, a distinction between requiring the Court to set forth its reasons in a written statement
and requiring the publication of that statement.
"'Section 3.30 (Approved Draft, 1977).
"'Section 3.36 (Approved Draft, 1977).
"' This analogy is developed in numerous places. See, e.g., Wasserstrom The Judicial Decision 25-30 (1961)
quoted in BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING CASES AND MATERIALS 3-5 (1975); Jones,
Multidue of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication As Group Decision-Making, 54 TULANE L. REv. 541,
542-43 (1980); Rubin, Book Reviews, 130 U. OF PA. L. REV. 220, 227 (1981).
"'CARRINGTON, MEADOR, & ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 10 (1976). See also Id. at 31.
' "See generally, FAIRMAN, VI RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888 864, 871-72, 1019-20 (1971). See
also MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTHER CONNECTION 377 n. 34 (1982).
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has been reiterated enough so as to be deserving of credit. '1 4 Indeed, any lawyer
who has served as an arbitrator where written opinions are required or who
has authored frequent appellate briefs has probably within his or her own per-
sonal experience examples of conclusions which appeared overwhelming in
thought but which had to be abandoned once placed in written form. That these
same occurrences should happen in the preparation of written opinions by
Appellate Judges should not be surprising.
Like the debate over the effect of oral argument, the number of times in
which a tentative opinion may be changed by a requirement of writing upon
the issues presented by the appeal is not subject to easy verification. In part
this is because the very knowledge of a writing requirement may, in and of
itself, result in more serious attention to the case prior to the preparation of
any opinion. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the requirement of writing upon
each assignment of error serves a valuable validating function even if it does
nothing more than demonstrate the accuracy of the court's initial hunch. The
alternative to written opinions is, in the words of former Arkansas Supreme
Court Justice George R. Smith, that "judicial mistakes would proliferate beyond
knowing and beyond knowability.""'
A second concern is not only that the decision-making process be accurate,
but that it be perceived by the public and the litigants as being a fair one since
"[the] litigants and the public are reassured when they can see that the deter-
mination emerged at the end of a reasoning process that is explicity stated, rather
than as an imperious ukase without a nod to law or a need to justify."' 6 A
written decision, accessible to the public, can give assurance that the "correc-
tive process is working"; ' 17 provide an understanding of "how the numerous
decisions of the system are integrated";' I and give a basis for dispell notions
that decisions are made upon other than legal grounds. '9 Thus, the use of written
opinions may be directly linked to the legitimacy of the action of the court and
thereby to its effectiveness in the community as a proper institution to resolve
disputes.
"'Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit, in confirming the experiences of Judge Coffin of the First Circuit,
recently described the phenomena in these terms:
We read the briefs, we study the record, we decide that we will affirm or reverse, and we
undertake to prepare an opinion stating the decision and its rationale. We find that "it won't write"
- our jargon for saying that we cannot prepare an opinion reaching the desired result in acceptable
professional form. We start over and we find that our second opinion not only reaches an opposite
result, but that it also conforms to our jurisprudential standards. By this time, the result that we
originally rejected appears correct... the discipline of opinion writing does affect the result. Rubin,
supra note 111, at 227.
"Rose, The Primer of Opinion Writing for Four New Judges, HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 127 (Winters ed.
1975).
"'Supra note 112.
"Id. at 10.
AId.
"'Like the dissent, the requirement of a written opinion may serve as a check upon judicial misconduct.
It has been thought that the requirements of giving reasons for opinions was security for honesty because
"some persons would be ashamed to talk nonsense to the world in support of a judgment that they would
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Nor should one ignore the relationship between the Court of Appeals and
other actors within the judicial system. To be sure, the requirement that an
intermediate appellate court write an opinion responsive to the issues raised
on appeal may be beneficial to the state Supreme Court making decisions about
discretionary review. It may also be helpful to the United States Supreme Court
in making those same decisions and to the federal courts who may be forced
to consider which issues were properly resolved in habeas corpus.' 20 Of equal
importance, a written opinion may be utilized, even if not published, for pur-
poses of certifying a conflict between state Court of Appeals for purposes of
obtaining review by the Ohio Supreme Court.' 2 '
The written opinion has an effect not only upon counsel but upon the public
as well. As Judge Skelly Wright has observed:
In applying and shaping law to novel arrays of facts, judges are re-
quired by their office not just to decide particular cases but to justify their
decisions in terms of more generally valid principles or policies. Members
of the public bear no similar obligation to think systematically. Their moral
and legal views are far more likely to be intuitive - unreflective hunches
about what is right in this or that particular case .... [T]he judge's task
is frequently to formulate principles that are persuasive in their own right
- rationales that the public, if it troubled to give the matter serious
thought, would hopefully find persuasive .. .122
Even in a case which has little public interest, 23 the same imperatives apply
to counsel and his or her client. Judge McCree rhetorically suggests that one
"try explaining to a client why the court ruled against him when the only judg-
ment you have says nothing more than 'affirmed'." 2 , Assuming the advocate
has prepared a brief which presents claims that are at least plausible to the client,
the most natural conclusion to be drawn is that the court failed to make an
explanation of its rejection of the arguments upon appeal because it could not
do so. Hence, in the eyes of many a client, the court's unexplained opinion
is, in and of itself, persuasive evidence of an illegitimate result.
suffer themselves to give silently." Lord Hardwick, quoted in Holdsworth, XII History 250 quoted in
E. DUMBALD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 173 n. 118 (1978).
"MA habeas corpus petitioner is required to exhaust state remedies before presenting his or her claim to
the federal courts. However, the State Court's disposition of issue raised - whether treating the issues
on substantive or procedural grounds - may determine whether claims are properly cognizable in federal
courts. See generally YACKLE, POST CONVICTION REMEDIES 231-427 (1980).
"'For examples of the use of unpublished opinions for conflict certification purposes see Viers v. Dunlap,
I Ohio St. 3rd 173 (1982); Straub v. Voss, 1 Ohio St. 3rd 211 (1982); State v. Mowery, 1 Ohio St.3rd
192 (1982).
"'Wright, Book Review, 33 STANDARD L. REV. 179, 196 (1980).
"'One of the difficulties in allowing the Court to make decisions as to cases which do have widespread
public interest is that they may be in error. Consider, for example, Rowley v. Board of Education, 632
F. 2d 945, 948, n. 7 (7th Cir. 1980) where the court purported to find that its decision lacked "precedential
character" only to have the case accepted for certiorari and reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
450 U.S. 907 (1981).
'McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Wqrning 129 U. OF PA. L. REV. 777, 780 n. 21 (1981).
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Equally as important, a convincing explanation of the reasons for a disposi-
tion of a case may have an effect upon counsel's judgment of the case and
the future course of the litigation. It is not uncommon for counsel, no matter how
diligent in research, to discover an unexpected view or an undiscovered case
in a Court of Appeals opinion. While this may not always change his or her
mind about the fairness of the result below, it may have a major impact upon
the assessment of the prospects of relief in further litigation. One of the conse-
quences of a written opinion may be to terminate, or at least narrow the scope,
of the litigation.
Though these considerations apply generally to the concept of writing an
opinion, they also apply with equal force to vindicate the existence of Ohio's
Appellate Rule requiring the court to write upon each assignment of error. The
failure to address any assignment of error properly raised by the parties
suffers from the same defects as the failure to write at all: it provides no test
of the court's opinion upon the issues not addressed; it does nothing to assure
the public that reasoned consideration was given by the court to the omitted
issue; and it provides no information to other participants in the judicial system
about the nature of the court's reasoning process. Ohio Appellate Rule 12 serves
to effectively implement the values underlying the requirement that courts not
simply say "trust us," but explain the reasons for their decision. 25 Since that
is a policy which is one of the strengths of the Ohio appellate system it should
be continued as presently constituted.
X. SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOus APPEALS
Messrs. Parness and Reagle advocate the use of sanctions for "frivolous"
appeals. 26 The difficulty with this concept is that: "Frivolity is in the eye of
the beholder. One person's frivolity is another person's ingenuity." 2 '
"'The only criticism of the current rule which is not responded to by the policy reasons supporting published
opinions is that which indicates that the Judges do not follow the rule anyway because they use "boilerplate
reasons" in disposing of "many types of assignments of error." Parness & Reagle, supra note 14 at __.
Three observations are in order:
First, if the point is seriously made that the Judges are in violation of Rule 12 then enforcement,
not abandonment, would seem to be the appropriate response.
Second, if by "boilerplate" responses it is meant that the Court has standard responses which include
the applicable legal standards, but that an individual determination is still made, then the practice would
not seem to be objectionable.
Third, the claim made is contrary to the author's personal experience. In reading, in one capacity
or another, what must easily be over 1,000 unpublished Ohio Court of Appeals opinions the author's
impression is that most panels of the Court attempt to comply with the Rule. While one may often desire
a more detailed explanation of reasons, the decisions of the Ohio Courts of Appeals compare most favorably
to the two-page unpublished opinions of the Sixth Circuit.
"'Parness & Reagle, supra note 6 at 32-35.
'Attorney Ronald Mallen, author of Legal Malpractice (1981) and Chair of next year's A.B.A. Standing
Committee on Professional Liability quoted in Hurley, Much Ado About Nothing, DocEr CALL Summer,
1982, at 15.
It has been suggested that many suits denominated frivolous are a product of a breakdown of the
relationship between individuals and institutions which, in the past, would have resolved the disputes without
resort to the judicial system. See generally id. at 15. At the same time, Jethro Liberman, author of The
Litigious Society suggests that many of the suits in question are actually "frontier cases" and that calling
them frivolous is "an insult that's easy to hurl at what you don't like." Id. Hurley sets forth fourteen
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Consider a few examples. What about the attorney who consistently raises
claims that judges might describe as frivolous because the court overrules the
overwhelming majority of them? The complaint may be made that though the
court knows he or she is wrong, it has to work hard in order to prove it. In
spite of the ultimate resolution the case was apparently a difficult one for the
court. Because the court ultimately rejects such arguments, it is understandable
that judges may see this as unproductive time. However, any issue the court
has to struggle with is, by definition, non-frivolous.
Cases in which the legal issues have already been resolved contrary to the
appellant's position would normally be considered one of those categories of
cases which could easily be denominated frivolous. But, even the United States
Supreme Court reverses itself.'2 For example,. in Monroe v. Pape'29 the Warren
Court, after canvassing the legislative history, concluded that cities were not
persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That was a decision which
seemed to weather time well and which one would have thought the Burger
Court would not have been predisposed to change. This is all the more true
since Congress could have overruled Monroe by enacting legislation to change
or define the word person. It is now a matter of history, though, that the Burger
Court did overrule Monroe in Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Sciences.'30 And we have examples of Judges who have indicated that they would
not follow their own prior decisions. Justice Holmes, upon being quoted dictum
from his opinion in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel Attorney General'3' during
the oral argument in Near v. Minnesota, 32 was supposed to have "smilingly"
interrupted the state's attorney and said: "I was much younger when I wrote
that opinion than I am now. If I did make such a holding, I now have a different
view."' 33
In these instances counsel on one side was proceeding against what appeared
to be well-established precedent. They, of course, were fortunate enough to
examples that he believes fall within the "don't like" category.
For a discussion of a California case where the intermediate appellate court imposed a $500 sanction
for a frivolous appeal only to be reversed by the California State Supreme Court see Grace, The Purpose
of Sanctions, JUDGES' J. (Summer, 1982). The disagreement between the California Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court illustrates the difficulties in this area. The court of appeals deemed the appeal "utterly
hopeless." However, the state supreme court was quoted as applying a different standard: "Counsel and
their client have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that
they will win in appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous and should
not incur sanctions." Id.
" Between 1960 and 1979 the Supreme Court explicitly overruled 47 of its own cases. Maltz, Some Thoughts
on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 494-96.
9365 U.S. 167 (1961).
-436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3205 U.S. 454 (1907).
.132283 U.S. 697 (1931).
'"Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historial Developments, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 95, 152 n.
251 (1981) quoting R. McCoRMICK, THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 51 (1936). Justice Douglas indicated that
his vote to affirm in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) was a mistake, DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEARS, 1939-1975 39, 279-80 (1980).
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ultimately prevail in the high court. But what of individuals who raised these
same issues and did not proceed to further appeal or whose case was not heard
because the Court refused to exercise its discretion and grant certiorari? Are
they to have sanctions imposed upon them?
These examples demonstrate the difficulty in establishing an appeal which
could be termed the proper subject of sanctions. The skillful lawyer who wants
to present the appeal will always be in a position to make a non-frivolous claim,
even if only by announcing that he or she is bringing the appeal for the very
purpose of changing the established law and seeking to overturn well-established
cases. Consequently, except as a trap for the unwary, sanctions for frivolous
appeals will always be largely illusory.
XI. ALTERNATIVES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Justice Holmes once cautioned that "we need education in the obvious
more than investigation of the obscure.""'3 The obvious may include the
discovery of choices where none are thought to exist; or, it may include the
revelation of assumptions made but not articulated.
The number of appellate cases filed is increasing as is the backlog of cases
in many courts. The response of many is that recognition of caseload increase
inevitably leads to the assumption that backlog must be reduced. A typical
response is to express regret about the reduction of oral argument but to con-
clude that "the logistics of a huge docket permit no alternative."'3
This approach overlooks the fact that alternatives do exist. It is one thing
to argue that the benefits of resolving cases are such that expeditious treatment
is worth the cost of eliminating some part of the traditional appellate process.
But, it is quite another to claim that there are no alternatives. One alternative
is to simply let the case backlog increase. One may say this is an undesirable
alternative. However, recognizing its existence makes debate possible on the
merits of allowing such a backlog to exist. Regretfully, those concerned with
court administration too often merge the fact of growing caseload with the
assumption that such backlog must be corrected and thereby stifle any debate
upon the alternatives. 3 '
"'4Quoted in F. WEINER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL ON MARITAL LAW 16 (1940) citing O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 292-93.
' 'Engle, Oral Advocacy at the Appellate Level, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1981) (emphasis added).
Similar views were expressed by a judge of the Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals when he
indicated that given the court's caseload the court "can't give oral argument in every case. Wasby, Oral
Argument in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The View from the Bench and Bar, 11 GOLDEN GATE
L. REv. 21, 28 (1981). This concern with caseload appears to be shared by the Ohio Bar Foundation which
had indicated that its "first priority" will be an "in-depth study of the administration of justice in Ohio"
which focuses upon "efficiency" and "case flow management." See Swisher, Report of the Research
Director to the Fellows, 54 OHIo BAR 2074, 2077 (1981). See also, Parness and Reagle, supra note 6, at 3,
terming the increase in case load a "crisis" and indicating "[n]ecessity" has caused appellate courts to
establish "new techniques for handling caseload pressures." Applying the same principle to Ohio, they
are willing to assume that "all appellate cases... must be immutably accorded the full range of all appellate
procedures." Id. at 14.
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A. Creative Inaction
"Speedy" justice is held out as a high ideal and delay in the disposition
of cases has been seen as an historic evil. 37 Delay was, of course, one of the
evils decried by Roscoe Pound in his address on the causes of popular discon-
tent with the judiciary.'38
Because of the high value placed upon speedy disposition of cases and an
abhorrence of delay, courts with heavy caseloads tend to adopt an assembly-
line concept of justice. This was first evidenced in courts "processing"
misdemeanors:
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total
preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar
is long, speed often a substitute for care, and casually arranged out-of-
court compromise too often is substituted for adjudication. Inadequate
attention tends to be given to the individual defendant, in protecting his
rights, shifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or
determining how to deal with him after conviction. 3 9
That same type of volume now exists in many domestic relations courts, with
the same attendant criticisms.
Historically, one of the tensions between the high-volume trial courts and
the less pressured appellate courts has been upon the manner in which such
cases should be disposed. Appellate courts made decisions which sought to im-
pose process-oriented requirements upon the trial court which both consume
time and cause increased expense. A reading of the appellate opinions often
leads one to the conclusion that appellate courts were shocked by the lack of
individual attention and procedure afforded to each case. By contrast, it was
not uncommon for the trial judges in such high-volume courts to decry the
impractibility and naivete of the appellate judges and attempt to mitigate the
impact of those decisions upon their day-to-day lives.
"'This is often accomplished by ascribing improper motives to anyone who opposes "improvements"
in the appellate system.
For example, one leading advocate of court reform, Daniel Meador, has concluded that while there
may be exceptions, the "dominant attitude among individual lawyers and among the organized bar is
either indifference or negativism regarding proposals to alter existing structure, jurisdiction or procedure"
as a method of reforming the court. Meader, The Federal Judiciary - Inflation, Malfunction, and a
Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REv. 617, 639. He indicates that these attitudes may be
attributable to "several reasons" and catalogues the following: I) inertia; 2) specialization of the bar causing
counsel to protect their client's interests which might be jeopardized by reform; and 3) the lawyer's own
economic interests. Id. at 639-40.
It is interesting to note that nowhere is allowance made for the fact that the proposed reforms may
be ill-conceived (surely there must be some reform which is ill-conceived) or that the opposition may stem
from a reasoned good-faith disagreement.
..'E.g., Habakkuk 1:4: "Therefore the law is slacked, and judgment doth never go forth: for the wicked
doth compass about the righteous; therefore wrong judgment proceedeth."
"'Pound, The Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REp. 395
(1906) reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
9'THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967) quoted with approval in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-35
(1972) (emphasis added).
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It is therefore ironic that as the appellate courts themselves are experienc-
ing increasing case loads, the are moving away from their own model and
approaching closer approximations to the techniques of high-volume trial courts
that they have previously condemned.
Former Attorney General Bork has indicated that the increase in the volume
and the complexity in cases in the federal courts threaten to convert the United
States Court of Appeals from "deliberative institutions to processing
institutions."'1 0 And Chief Justice Burger has quoted with apparent approval
Solicitor General Bork's conclusion that the work load forces the courts "towards
an assembly line model."'
14
1
This is the result of a heightened concern for the disposition rate of cases.
However, there are other values to be considered besides processing cases: "A
judge's time is precious, to be sure, but precious only in relation to the task
the judge performs." ' 42 As Judge Oakes has indicated, there must be more to
judging than "mere bureaucratic management."1 43
This obsession with processing cases has not always held such sway. For
example, in an analysis of the embryonic Court of Claims, one of that court's
reporters indicated:
It is almost an axiom that justice is neither swift nor cheap. The sum-
mary proceedings before a Turkish Cadi are an exception. But in courts,
where deliberation and method are supposed to prevail, the process is
always attended with expense. As a general thing, cheapen justice and you
will weaken its administration. '4
A good expression of this concept in modern times is that of Judge McKay
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:
[A] much loved cliche is based on a false assumption that inhibits
clear thinking about the management of the judicial process. That cliche
is: justice delayed is justice denied. It essentially assumes a cost-free access
to judicial dispute resolution ... no system would ever tolerate enough
judges to permit all disputants who desire a chance for prompt low-cost
access to judicial settlement.'45
The result is that when judges crave speedier judicial processes it may result
in a "parody of the judicial function.' .4 6
"'Bork, Dealing with Overloads in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 233 (1976).
'W. BURGER, YEAR END REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY 2 (1981).
"
2 Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F. 2d 348, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godberg, J., dissenting).
"'Oakes, On the Craft and Philosophy of Judging, 80 MICH. L. REv. 579, 587 (1982).
'"Devereux, The Court of Claims, Its Origin and Progress, DEVEREUX'S COURT OF CLAIMS REPORTS 10
App. (1856).
'Letter from Judge Monroe G. McKay to Attorney Beverly J. Quail (April 8, 1981) (Copy on file with
author.)
"'New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). In
that case, of course, Chief Justice Burger was referring to what he considered the over-expeditious treatment
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Thus analyzed, the problem may not be the increasing case load but the
judiciary's attempt to take action itself to decrease that case load." 7 Certainly
one option that should be considered is to do nothing. The courts could con-
tinue to give individual attention to each case in the manner in which they have
always done without thinking about any resulting backlog. This might have
a number of consequences.
First, it is possible that such an approach, while leading to increasing
backlog, would prompt someone outside the judiciary to take some corrective
action. That corrective action might be to increase the number of judges, to
limit the court's jurisdiction, or to take some as of yet unthought of approach.
It might also be to order the judges - by something akin to a speedy trial statute
- to decide the cases within a specified amount of time. If the choice is to
be made between preserving the traditional role of the appellate courts and an
increasing backlog in the disposition of cases, that choice might be more pro-
perly made by the legislative branch of government than the judiciary. Even
if the Legislature took no action, this would in and of itself be a choice: By
inaction the Legislature might well be saying that the delay and backlog - no
matter how great -does not outweigh the virtues that the traditional judicial
process protects.
Equally as important, an economic analysis of the appellate system would
suggest that eventually the backlog would lead to its own solution. There sure-
ly must be a point in time when the increased delay and expense of appeal will
make it a less attractive alternative. One would think that the demand for appeals
is somewhat elastic and that on a simple supply/demand curve, as the delay
increases, the number of individuals seeking appeal might decrease. 8 Further,
that individual case was receiving - without adequate time for briefing by the parties and reflection by
the Justices. These sentiments were echoed by Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun in their separate dissents.
Both the magnitude of the legal issues involved in New York Times as well as the schedule for decision
that was set by the Court were unique circumstances which may not be generally applicable to intermediate
state appellate courts. However, it is noteworthy that the sentiments expressed by the dissenters provide
an equally sound rationale against attempting to process any case without full deliberation.
"'This point is recognized in Marvell, supra note 3, at 47.
The amount of delay depends mainly on how much the judges tolerate delay, not on caseload
size.... The reaction of some courts to rising caseloads has been to continue the traditional, thorough
decision procedures, while accumulating a backlog. The reaction of other courts has been to increase
productivity by chopping away at traditional decision procedures (and often by working harder),
and thus giving less attention to each case.
"'Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth
Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 73 n. 39 (1981) citing T. CHURCH L. LEE, J. TAN, A. CARLSON, & V.
MCCONNELL, PRETRIAL DELAY 20 (1978). While it is true that generally the rate of growth of the appellate
case load "does not appear to be abating," Marvel, supra note 3, at 43, more recent statistics show an
actual decline within certain categories of cases. For example, within the former Fifth Circuit United States
Court of Appeals the number of prisoner appeals decreased by 4.3% between 1979 and 1980. Wisdom,
Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. Rav. 787, 791 (1980). In the Sixth Circuit United States Court of
Appeals the number of prisoner appeals declined from 546 in 1981 to 517 in 1982. For the same years
the number of criminal appeals declined from 351 to 347. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1982).
Iln Summit County (Akron), Ohio, the number of post-conviction petitions filed in the trial courtsfell amost 50 percent in a twelve-month period. Akron Beacon Journal, July 19, 1982, at D 1-2. The time
period in which 75 petitions were filed was between June 19, 1980 and June 29, 1981. The following 12
months was the period in which only 47 petitions were filed. In this case, it may be "futility" which caused
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delay may increase the settlement process that Messrs. Parness, Reagle and Judge
Day all advocate.
The point of all of this is to emphasize that alternatives to abandoning
the procedured traditionally afforded by the appellate process do exist and that
one of those alternatives is to tolerate increasing case filings and backlog. Though
this is, understandably, not a view frequently advocated by those writing in
the area of appellate reform, it may be the most appropriate position to take
given the fact that "there are no hard facts to establish that delay causes litigants
much harm." ,,9 This is particularly true since there is evidence to indicate that
a substantial majority of lawyers would be willing to accept even greater delay
in the appellate process rather than to give up either oral argument or written
opinions. 10
B. Modest Proposals
This approach would not, of course, mean that the courts could not take
steps to improve their own efficiency as long as they did not diminish their
effectiveness. For example, technological innovations such as the use of word
processing equipment could decrease judicial time in editing and revising opinions
and, at the same time, decrease the time required for producing opinions.'
Similarly, changes might be made in certain court procedures without
effecting its role. For example, Ohio Appellate Rule 18(A) provides that appellate
briefs must be filed within twenty days after the filing of the record. This re-
quirement that the briefs be filed within twenty days after the filing of the record
is the most stringent requirement in the nation. The norm appears to be between
thirty and forty-five days and in some jurisdictions it is as long as seventy days
after the record is transmitted.' 52 In at least some appellate districts a first
extension of time for twenty to thirty days is granted almost as a matter of
course." Given the backlog of appellate cases waiting for argument, this results
in no delay to the final disposition of the case. However, it does mean that
busy attorneys must prepare motions for extension of time and that busy judges
must review those motions.
An alternative to this procedure exists in the federal courts where the
the decline. Common Pleas Judge Frank J. Baird is quoted as saying: "I believe the word has gotten through
to the institutions that it is a waste of time." Id. at 2.
l4"Marvell, supra note 3, at 47.
' *Supra note 58.
11'Much of the time involved in preparing opinions consists of re-writing and editing drafts. Recopying
those portions in which no changes were made not only consumes time, but also creates an opportunity
for new errors which requires renewed proofreading. Word processing equipment produces faster copy
with less investment in court staff time. ABA TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND
JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 63 (1977).
"'See generally STERN, supra note 66, at 219-20 (1981).
"'Such a practice is specifically codified by Local Rule II.3 of the Seventh District which provides that
the first motion for extension of time "will be granted" unless special circumstances exist to make an
extension inappropriate.
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appellant's brief is not due in the court of appeals until forty days after the
filing of the record.'54 If the Ohio rules were amended to either allow a longer
time for filing, or, in the alternative, to allow the court the flexibility to pro-
vide for longer time in filing by local rule, there would be no predictable delay
in the disposition of any cases. But the entire judicial system would save time
and money that is currently expended in preparing and reviewing these motions.
Even with a longer time to file the appellant's opening brief there would
probably still be some motions for extension of time. The federal system offers
another example of an alternative to existing procedure. In the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals the clerk of courts has the power to grant or deny extensions,I"
subject to the limitation that any party dissatisfied with that decision may
"appeal" to a judge of the court.,56 Within the state court system such decision-
making power could be allocated to either the clerk of courts or the court
administrator, where such an officer exists, without jeopardizing either the rights
of parties or improperly delegating judicial authority. At the same time this
would free upprecious judicial time without any corresponding negative costs. ""
Though these savings may be small ones, given the fact that they would not
work any fundamental changes in the nature of the appellate process there should
be no serious objection to their implementation.
There are, of course, also non-traditional approaches to curing the pro-
blem of case backlog. For example, in the State of Oklahoma some 600 volunteer
attorneys were appointed by the state supreme court to sit on temporary panels
to decide cases to attempt to alleviate a 2,600-case backlog. I58 Such a proposal
would most likely require constitutional revision before it could be implemented
in Ohio,'59 and might encounter opposition from members of the bench.' 61 Yet
"
4 FED. R. APP.P. 31(a).
"'Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Rules 4(f) and 8(c).
"'My own experience with this system is that it is a satisfactory one. Though I have been involved in
several cases in which counsel on one side or the other has asked for an extension of time, I know of
no instance in which an "appeal" was taken to one of the judges.
'"For an account of the change in the Sixth Circuit from having all motions considered by panels of judges
to routing procedural motions to the Clerk, and the success of that program, see Hehrnan, Motions Practice
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 12 TOL. L. REV. 485 (1981). For a description
of the same procedures in the Ninth Circuit see Heilman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience
of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937, 953-58 (1980).
"'Lawyers Recruited as Judges in Oklahoma, 68 A.B.A.J. 792 (1982).
"'One might argue that a statute authorizing the appointment of attorneys as "temporary" or "acting"
judges might suffice. However, the Ohio Constitution speaks of the court of appeals as being composed
of judges, art. IV, § 3 (A) and makes specific provision for their election, art. IV § 6 (A) (2). Moreover,
while provisions are made for common pleas, appellate and retired judges to set in the court of appeals
by assignment, art. VI § 6 (C) and art. IV § 5 (A)(3), there is no provision for the utilization of attorneys
in a similar capacity.
"'There might be a natural aversion to allowing attorneys to assume the role of a judge - even for a
short time. In part, this might be susceptible to the criticism previously discussed about diminishing the
prestigious status of the judiciary. In part, it also might be part of a fear that an attorney would later
attempt to use this experience as a credential in running for a judgeship. However, on the merits, it would
seem likely that some attorneys who have active appellate practices would be in a position to render service
as a temporary judge. Surely there must be some individuals in the practicing bar who the court would
view as having the competence to render proper judicial decisions. Indeed, because of the very institutional
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with slight revision it might provide a real solution to some of the problems
which concern the participants in this symposium.
If the Oklahoma model were followed, the lawyers would volunteer their
time so that there would be no expense involved. If the lawyers were limited
in the number of cases which they could hear, one could be assured that delibera-
tions would proceed in a traditional fashion with full attention being given to
each case. If, unlike the Oklahoma system, one attorney were paired with two
sitting judges, one could be assured of stability within the system itself since
at least one regular judge would have to agree with the attorney-judge before
a decision could be rendered.
One further option might be to create an alternative track for appeals giv-
ing the parties the right to elect to have the case heard by three judges with
the understanding that the disposition would take longer or by a panel con-
sisting of two judges and one attorney-judge with the understanding that the
case could be heard more promptly. Under this system the temporary judges
could be used until the backlog was reduced to a specified level. Then the pro-
gram could be held in abeyance until such time as the backlog again reached
a point that outside assistance was desirable.
C. Modifying Jurisdiction
If the appellate courts were to insist upon exercising their traditional func-
tions, then an increase in backlog might prompt the legislature to take some
corrective action. In a valuable study Professor David Clark has demonstrated
that, at the federal trial level, substantial reductions in backlog occurred when
events arose which reduced the total number of filings: 6 1 abolition of liquor
prohibition;' 62 end of rent controls and other controls under the Defense Pro-
duction Act;'63 and statutory changes making it harder to be a plaintiff in federal
court. 'I6, This same process would seem to be applicable to appeals by limiting
the types of claims that enter into the judicial system at the trial level, one may
limit the number of appeals and hence escape the backlog of pending cases. 65
differences between a trial court and an appellate court, it is likely that some members of the appellate
bar would be more suited to serve in the role as a temporary appellate judge than are trial judges who
are, from time to time, assigned to sit upon the Court of Appeals. See Marvel supra note 3, at 52 and
footnote 3 1, suggesting that in Missouri and Washington the use of trial judges temporarily assigned as
appellate judges proved unsatisfactory.
'
61Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Court in the Twentieth
Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981).
'
62Id. at 139-41.
'"Id. at 126, Table 15 (citations omitted) (1954).
'"Id. at 132. In 1958 Congress increased the amount necessary for diversity and federal question jurisdiction,
redefined corporate citizenship to make diversity more difficult, and prohibited the removal of state worker's
compensation cases from state to federal courts.
'"Emphasis is placed here upon trial filings rather than upon appellate filings because of the belief that
it is more appropriate to treat the entire system than isolated parts. For example, the proposal of Messrs.
Parness & Reagle to limit appeals in such a way as to exclude certain misdemeanors may be both over
and under inclusive.
It is conceivable that many statutes involving first amendment claims (vagrancy, disorderly conduct,
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Such a process may include trying to divert certain cases into arbitration
or neighborhood dispute centers.' 66 It might involve the use of economic incen-
tives such as controlling the interest rate on judgments. 6 7 But it is likely that
such an approach, to be successful, would involve more fundamental - and
harder - choices. Though these choices could be identified only by a systematic
consideration of which statutes generate the most appeals, they might include:
Is it more important to provide punishment for those selling materials deemed
to be obscene 1 8 or to provide protection under the Consumer Sales Practices
Act?' 6 9 Is it better to regulate landlord-tenant relations'70 or enact legislation
providing for no-fault insurance? The very difficulty and controversial nature
of such decisions make it unlikely that they would be adopted as an alternative
to delay in the appellate courts.
XI. CONCLUSION
Robert Stern, in Appellate Practice in the United States 7' has indicated
that the "accepted model for fair appellate procedure" has generally included
the right to appeal to one appellate court; the right to present arguments to
the appellate court both orally and in written briefs; and the right to have the
court disclose the reasoning underlying its decision. I" Mr. Stern acknowledges
that these "fundamental elements of the appellate process" are being eroded
and attributes that impairment to the "rapid increase in the number of cases
taken to the appellate courts in recent years.' ' 73
There are many who would emphasize the promise of avoiding delay;
identify increasing appellate caseloads and backlogs as a disease which must
be treated; and prescribe, inter alia, limitations on oral arguments and the
elimination of written opinions as a prescription for the illness. But those
"measures may, like any strong medicine, produce side effects as serious as
the disease they seek to cure."'"7
etc.) would be insulated from review under their proposal while others of less general importance would
be the subject of review. (One option might be to give this case the type of discretionary review advocated
by Judge Day for all appellate cases. However, this would still require work by the Appellate Court in
making a case-by-case decision to determine whether review should be granted.
At the same time, the number of such cases appealed may not be statistically significant. For example,
the Akron Municipal Court - Judicial Division - Annual Report 1981 at 8, indicates that of 8,783 cases
disposed of by the Court, there were only 15 appeals in misdemeanor cases. (No statistics were given as
to how many of those cases reached actual disposition in the court of appeals.)
" 'E.g., Erikson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the
Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 280-84 (1977).
"'E.g., Franelli, Interest Hike on Judgements: An Appealing Remedy?, NAT'L. L.J. March 2, 1982, at 3.
"'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Page 1980).
"'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-1345.99 (Page 1979).
'"OOHIo RFv. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01-5321.19 (Page 1981).
"'Supra note 66.
'Id. at 22.
1731d.
"ABA TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND
SELECTED MATERIALS 1 (1977).
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. . . appellate justice can be the last best effort of our government and
our law to gain respect and acceptance of the people. Appellate justice
should be a model for the government's dealings with citizens. Appellate
courts are the most dignified and receptive authorities to which individuals
can turn to express their legal dissatisfactions in a pointed way, with
assurance of a direct response. If these courts do not deal justly with
litigants, we cannot expect agencies or bureaucracies of lesser sensitivity
to legal rights to do so.' 75
But in order to fulfill that promise we, like the Constitution, must recognize
that there are "higher values than speed and efficiency. ' 171 6 To do otherwise
is to avoid delay only at the cost of denying justice.
"'Supra note 65, at v.
'76Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1971).
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